Posted: June 22nd, 2015

How effective has the Cambodian diplomatic service been in encouraging Chinese investment into the country?

Literature Review

The purpose of this present chapter is to introduce the previous literature review about the diplomatic relations between Cambodia and China. In this chapter, it will illustrate about China and the world in the late 20th, China and its neigbours, Cambodia Background, Current Sino-Cambodia relations and the role of the diplomacy. In the last section of this chapter, it will demonstrate the different meaning of diplomacy and the role of diplomacy to promote its country. This chapter not only helps to understand the topic, but also raise the knowledge of how important the topic is.

China and the world in late 20th

China is undoubtedly a dominant economic and military power in the Southeast Asian region. It should, however, be pointed out that the economic, political and military dominance of China in this region is often treated with both uneasiness and enthusiasm depending on the side particulars nations are aligned to in the South East Asian balance of power. Uneasiness is common among Southeast Asian countries that fear that the rise of China might cause instability in South East Asia (Guan n.d). Enthusiasm and hope is common among countries that have long maintained good diplomatic relations with China (Yuan 2006). Countries that view China’s rise with favour include Cambodia, Burma and Laos (Guan n.d). The kingdom of Cambodia (Preah Réachéanachâkr Kâmpuchea) has especially maintained close relations with Beijing since the 1950s (Sambath n.d). The relations between Cambodia and China significantly improved during the 1990s as China played a positive role in facilitating the return of peace and stability in the country.

It should essentially be noted that China’s maintenance of good relations with countries on its periphery is part of Beijing’s ‘grand strategy’ for Asia (Glaser 2014). It is a strategy that the Chinese political leadership has articulated in various international forums. The first component of China’s grand strategy in Asia is to make its neighbours politically friendly. The second component of this strategy is to establish close economic relations with her neighbours. Lastly, China intends to establish deeper security cooperation and closer people-to-people ties (Glaser 2014). China endeavour to spread and solidify its influence in Eastern and Southeast Asia is, however, hampered (or thought to be hampered) by U.S. influence in the region as well as China’s aggressive activities in the South China sea, especially in the recent past (Glaser 2014). In fact, China’s grand strategy in Asia seeks to demonstrate to its neighbours that they stand to gain more by aligning their interests with those of the People’s Republic rather than seeking closer alliances with the U.S. According to Wang (2006), Beijing’s grand strategy not only seeks to weaken U.S. alliances in Southeast, but also counter America’s rebalancing efforts in the same region. China has, in fact, been seeking to counter America’s rebalancing efforts in Asia by forging even closer economic and political ties with countries in former Indochina (Burma, Laos and Cambodia) (Wang 2006).

Although Cambodia maintains cordial diplomatic relations with Asia-Pacific’s dominant power – the U.S., the country has traditionally been closer to Beijing than the U.S. In fact, Cambodia is currently regarded as China’s closest ally or friend in Southeast Asia (Kosal 2009). Historically speaking, Cambodia is among China’s oldest and closest allies in Southeast Asia. Economically speaking, China is Cambodia’s top foreign investor and foreign aid provider. China is also a vital trading partner for Cambodia with the Asian superpower investing trading with Cambodia more than does the European Union (EU) and the U.S. (Pheakdey 2012). In terms of culture, Chinese values are deeply entrenched in numerous aspects of Cambodian society (Pheakdey 2012). It is crucial to, however, point out that Sino-Cambodian relations are not entirely greeted with blanket approval in Phnom Penh. More specifically, there are murmurs of a huge trade balance between the two countries and talks of Chinese aid and investment having exacerbated corruption and human rights violations in Cambodia (Pheakdey 2012).

Some of the concerns raised over the current structure of Sino-Cambodian relations are obviously justified. It is the design of these relations, which informs this literature review section. More specifically, this section is concerned with the review of the studies that have addressed the Sino-Cambodian relations with a view to establishing how effective the Cambodian diplomatic service has been in encouraging Chinese investment in the Kingdom. The review, however, commences with an examination of the role of diplomacy and the state of relations between China and its neighbours before delving deeply into the structure and nature of the Sino-Cambodian relations.

The Role of Diplomacy

Diplomacy, according to Tamene (2004), is the management of international relations by negotiation. It is also the method by which international relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys (Tamene 2004). Another definition of this term is offered by Nakamura & Epstein (2007) who view diplomacy as the art and practice of conducting negotiations between representatives of groups of states/countries. An even simpler definition of the term is provided by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs – FDFA (2008) which posits that diplomacy is the means by which states all over the globe conduct their affairs in ways that foster peaceful relations (FDFA 2008). Nakamura & Epstein (2007) observe that diplomacy is an important component of inter-state relations and professional diplomats who are usually appointed by their respective states conduct it. Some of the major issues that diplomats handle include treaties, trade, war, peace, economic issues, and cultural cooperation (Nakamura & Epstein 2007).

It is crucial to point out that states deal with each other on a bilateral and multilateral context. Therefore, diplomacy takes place in the aforementioned context. In other words, diplomacy is used in conducting affairs between two states (bilateral) as well as among several states (multilateral) (FDFA 2008). Diplomacy in the multilateral context takes place within institutionalised settings such as international organisations, for instance, the United Nations Organisation (UNO) and its specialised agencies. It should essentially be noted that negotiation is the most common way of carrying out diplomacy. In fact, it is negotiation, which has resulted in the formation of the various international treaties and laws governing various fields. Treaties and international are primarily aimed at striking a balance among the interests of the various states (FDFA 2008).

There is a common saying among diplomats that diplomacy is as old as civilisation itself. Although it is not possible to provide an exact period when diplomacy came to be utilised in facilitating peaceful dialogue among political units, it is often estimated that diplomacy has been in existence since states, empires and other centres of power came into being (Aksha 2012). In fact, available evidence suggests that the earliest recorded diplomatic activity occurred about three and a half millennia ago in the near/middle east. This evidence is in the form of clay tables collectively known as “Amarna Letters” (Kurizaki 2007). They were discovered and excavated in 1887 at Tell el-Amarna, which were the capital of the Ancient Egyptian New Kingdom and the location of the ruin of the palace of King Amenhotep IV (Kurizaki 2007). The Amarna archive was found to contain an estimated 350 letters of which 50 of the letters were diplomatic correspondences between the Egyptian dynasties and its neighbours in the ancient Near East. These diplomatic correspondences spanned thirty-year period beginning in the final years of the reign of Amenhotep III to the initial years of the rule of Tutankhamen, which began in 14th century B.C. (Kurizaki 2007). The Amarna correspondences addressed issues such as inter-dynastic marriages, trade, alliances among other diplomatic issues (Black 2010).

International relations scholars observe that there is evidence of special missions being exchanged among the Greek City States as early as the 5th century B.C. (Black 2010). These scholars observe that diplomacy was very important among the Greek City States because it enabled them to manage relations with each other and also helped them advance their interests. According to Black (2010), diplomacy allowed Greek City States to cooperate in defending their territorial integrity, which was especially threatened by the Persian Achaemenid Empire (Black 2010). The Persian Achaemenid Empire occupied lands stretching from Southwest Asia to the Indus River as well as Egypt and Anatolia. This empire threatened the Greek City States with major attacks between 490 and 480 B.C. (Black 2010). Through diplomacy, the Greek City States were able forge a united front, which helped in warding off the Persian attacks, and curtail its expansionist intentions of the same Empire.

Apart from classical Greece, diplomacy was also in use in the Far East, and especially among ancient China and its neighbours. The ancient Chinese dynasties controlled various parts of what is today China and had their tributary and vassal states (Black 2010). There were special diplomatic protocols observed among the dynastic rulers and the respective rulers of the tributary states. More specifically, the vassal states and tributaries dispatched diplomatic missions deliver gifts and messages of allegiance to the dynastic rulers (Black 2010). Tributary and vassal states also dispatched diplomatic missions with annual tributes to the dynastic rulers. Diplomatic missions would continue to be a common feature in the interactions between Chinese emperors, their tributaries as well as neighbouring states when China was unified for the first time in 221 B.C. (Saha 2010). Several other kingdoms in South and Southeast Asia also maintained diplomatic contacts with imperial China as early as the 4th century A.D. (Saha 2010). Some of the Asian kingdoms that maintained diplomatic contacts with China through their envoys include the kingdoms of Java and Sumatra (now Indonesia) and the kings of Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) (Saha 2010).

Envoys have traditionally played a pivotal role in facilitating diplomacy. Ancient Egyptians, Chinese and the early Romans maintained treaty relations with neighbours with the full participation of their envoys. However, modern diplomacy and envoys gained prominence during the Italian Renaissance in the 15th century A.D. More specifically, what is known as diplomacy today began to take shape during the Italian Renaissance where diplomatic institutions were established in the Italian city-states (Black 2010). In fact, it was during the era of the Italian city-states that the practice of exchanging resident ambassadors and setting up permanent diplomatic missions began. According to Kurizaki (2007), resident ambassadors helped in providing constant communication among the Italian city-states. The practice of setting up permanent embassies and appointing resident ambassadors gradually spread to other parts of Europe and eventually evolved into what is today understood as modern diplomacy.

Embassies, ambassadors and other diplomatic professionals continue to feature prominently in modern diplomacy. Envoys and ambassadors were especially important in negotiating peace and the ending of wars especially during the First and Second World Wars (Manojlovic & Thorheim 2007). It should, however, be noted that in the contemporary world of diplomacy, ambassadors and other professional diplomats are tasked with more than the negotiation of peace and creating understanding between the countries they are posted to and the countries they represent (Manojlovic & Thorheim 2007). Rana & Chatterjee (n.d) observe that embassies and consulates play an important role in the economic and commercial sphere. More specifically, embassies and consulates are nowadays tasked with responsibility of helping business enterprises, industry bodies, consultants and others who carry out economic activities overseas to advance their interests (Hocking et al. 2012).

As Rana & Chatterjee (n.d) observe, empirical data shows that the role of contemporary diplomats and embassies in the past half-century revolves around four major tasks. The first of these tasks is the promotion of trade and investment among the concerned countries. The second task is the creation of networks and mobilisation of a broad cluster of supporters and participants in trade and investment promotion as well as technology acquisitions (Rana Chatterjee n.d). The third among these broad tasks is country promotion. In other words, embassies and consulates promote their countries as unique brands especially with regard to tourism and foreign investment destinations. Lastly, diplomats and diplomatic services help in creating the regulatory framework within which trade and commercial activities between their home countries and other states operate (Rana Chatterjee n.d). For instance, embassies and diplomats actively participate in the creation of free trade areas (FTAs) as well as international trade treaties such as the treaty establishing the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Rana Chatterjee n.d). These four broad tasks characterise the work of contemporary diplomats as well as diplomatic services.

Diplomacy between Cambodia & China

Cambodia has not been left behind in the process of international relations (Richardson, 2013). The country has developed measures that could be used to create ties with other countries not only in Asia, but also in Europe and the rest of the world. The civil war that locked the country is now over, meaning that it has the potential to remain on the course to achieve its national interests that include stability, sovereignty and economic development (Bell, 2014, pp. 79-112). It is also a nation that is on the course to develop its image in the world as it has been branded as a war torn country. The country has been taken through national reconciliation, as well as regional integration, which has ensured that it is on its way to become one of the lower middle-income countries that has a GDP growth, which has hit the 7 percent mark (Bell, 2014, pp. 79-112).

Most of the researchers have argued that the international arena is changing as there are many countries that are emerging as economic forces such as China and USA rebalancing Asia. Therefore, for Cambodia to effectively deal with these challenges, it has to be a relevant player within the region and develop a grand strategy for its own foreign policy (Cady, 1966). Most of the authors have defined a grand strategy as a set of integrated principles, as well as priorities that can be used to help a country to be able to navigate complex and dangerous international environment in order to remain on course to achieve its national interests (Chheang & Wong, 2012).

The gravity of the global power has been on a shift to the Asia-Pacific. This is especially in the 21st century, which has been in the favor of the Asian nations. Most of the countries such as China, India, and the ASEAN countries that include Cambodia have been enjoying a strong economic growth in the recent past. It is important to note that at this juncture, China, which has risen to be the world’s second largest economy, or people usually called as the ASEAN largest trading partner. East Asia in particular has been one of the regions focus for the Kingdom of Cambodia. To be specific, Cambodia has strengthened ties with Japan and China, which make the two largest forces in the East Asia region. Recent authors have argued that Cambodia upgraded its diplomatic relations with China and Japan to a level of strategic partnerships in the year of 2010 and 2013 consecutively (Chheang & Wong, 2012). The literature review also reveals that Cambodia has seen a change in foreign policy from a political diplomacy to one that is economic in nature (Lohman, 2014, p. 82). An active foreign policy was needed to ensure the country was able to mobilize the resources, as well as international assistance for its development. Some of the areas that seem to be largely affected were infrastructure, and poverty eradication (Leifer, 2009, pp. 361-374).

Cambodia is also following the six-point principle that is found in its constitution. One of the points is the one of permanent neutrality and nonalignment (Clymer, 2013, p. 179). The second one is the policy of peaceful coexistence not only with its neighbors, but also with the other countries across the globe. The other policy is that Cambodia will at no time interfere with the internal affairs of any neither country nor attack any country with the right measures put in place to make sure that all problems are solved in an amiable manner. No military alliance or pact will be signed with any country that does not support the policy of neutrality as used in Cambodia. The country does not also allow any foreign nation to open a military in the country and it does not also maintain any military base in any country. According to researchers, the aim of this point policy is to ensure that the country continues to get the international assistance that it has been receiving (Clymer, 2013, p. 179).

China and its Neighbours

The People’s Republic of China is a nation that interacts with foreign nations and has always stood at supporting peace at all times. The main aim of this policy of supporting peace with other nations is to make sure that it has preserved its independence and is able to benefit from globalization. One of the major things that the country does is to relate in an open way with its neighbors. The country is the most populated and has the largest number of neighbors at 14. The neighbors are also diverse both in terms of economy and politics. This calls for a change in the way that the county handles the countries that it interacts. One of the factors that determine the kind of relations that China has with the rest of the world is the fact that it has become one of the largest economies in the world in the recent past. This means that the number of economic ties that the country is experiencing is also increasing (Christensen, 2011, pp. 54-67). Its prosperity as a nation is fully dependent on the way it handles its neighbors from the region. China’s foreign policy can be divided into three. These divisions are economic interdependence, an increase in soft power, and diplomacy. Most authors who have written about the Chinese relations with the rest of Asia have argued that the three subdivisions usually overlap, which amplifies the overall effect in the region (Goldstein, 2013, pp. 49-89). This overall effect is the aspect of China being seen as a state that is unthreatening in any way. As stated at the beginning of this chapter, China has adopted the policy of ensuring peaceful coexistence between them and their neighbors. This is confirmed by the way that China deals with some of the challenges that face it with its neighbors. One of the things that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) can be credited for is the fact that it has been able to prevent the existence of a coalition against it. This success can only be attributed to the fact that the country has the three approaches mentioned above that are used to classify the way that it relates with its neighbors (Goldstein, 2013, pp. 49-89).

Furthermore, China’s relation with its neighbours is better analysed in the context of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). These relations can also not be examined without reference to China grand strategy. Ba (2003) essentially points out that relations between China and ASEAN have not always been smooth especially in modern times. ASEAN nations have been more concerned about China’s continued modernisation of its military as well as its territorial claims in the South China Sea. It is should equally be pointed out that Sino-ASEAN relations have come a long way since the People’s Republic and ASEAN were founded.

ASEAN was founded in 1967 and its founding members include Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines. Ba (2003) observes that the majority of the ASEAN members had a strained relationship with China especially between 1967 and 1978 when the People’s Republic was under the tight grip of Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). According to Yuan (2014), the aforementioned five Southeast Asian nations originally formed ASEAN in order to check the influence of China’s support of Communist groups and elements in their territories. It shall be recalled that Mao Zedong’s China was confrontational in its approach to international relations (Garver 2015). Mao saw China a revolutionary agent both in Asia and around the world. This explains the People’s Republic’s support for communist elements and parties in ASEAN member countries as well as Southeast Asian nations such as Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos among others especially in the 1960s and early 70s. Hussain (n.d), in fact, observes that China viewed the establishment of ASEAN with suspicion. More specifically, the Chinese Communists viewed ASEAN as having a hidden military agenda despite ASEAN member states’ claim that their association sought to foster economic cooperation which would in turn foster regional peace and stability.

It can, therefore, be concluded that China’s relations with the majority of its southeast Asian neighbours in the 1960s was characterised by suspicions and distrust as well as animosity. It should be pointed out that Southeast Asia was massively affected by the super power contests of the Cold War where China was a pivotal player. The U.S. was especially keen on mobilising non-communists nations in Southeast Asia into establishing a united front against communist China (Yuan 2014). The relationship between China and its Southeast Asia neighbours would gradually begin to change following the death of Mao Zedong and the ascendancy to power of the second-generation communist leadership led by Deng Xiaoping (Garver 2015). Chinese affairs’ observers as well as scholars of far-east studies agree that Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping did share a vision of making China powerful and respectable. Garver (2015), however, observes that these two great Chinese communist leaders differed in their approaches of realising this vision. Mao, on the one hand, engaged in military and diplomatic manoeuvres with China’s strong and powerful neighbours such as the U.S. and U.S.S.R. while at the same time employing coercive strategies against weaker neighbours in south east Asia (Saha 2010). It was mentioned earlier that China had always featured prominently in global history, in general, and Asian history, in particular. According to modern Chinese nationalist narrative, China’s cultural achievements over the centuries and great state power made China, by right, a leading power in east Asia and the world (Garver 2015). Chinese nationalists see this image and status as having been destroyed and tarnished by aggressive Western imperialists in the 19th century. It is this Western imperial aggressiveness that reduced China into a ‘semi-colony’ and subjected the Chinese masses to ‘national slavery’ (Garver 2015). To these nationalists, the 19th century was a ‘century of national humiliation’ for all Chinese. It is this image of national humiliation that Mao and CCP were keen on discarding. More precisely, Mao and the CCP sought to restore China back to its position of international eminence (Garver 2015). Mao’s strategy for realising this vision is focusing centred on military power and confrontation and the establishment of comprehensive state control and planning. Mao also wanted to establish China as a leading revolutionary force in the world hence China support for communist insurgents around Southeast Asia (Saha 2010).

Although Deng Xiaoping shared Mao’s vision of making China prosperous and powerful, he subscribed to an entirely different approach for realising this vision. Saha (2010) observes that Deng and his followers concluded that Mao’s confrontational approach to international affairs and his militarisation of the Chinese economy and society had made China weak rather than powerful. Deng, therefore, sought to de-militarise China and ease state control over people’s lives (Saha 2010). Deng and his followers also sought to institute free-market economic policies rather the collectivisation of the same as witnessed during Mao’s era. Under Deng’s leadership, China shifted its focus from war and revolution to peace and development. For the free-market economic policies to bear fruits, China had to rethink its relations with its southeast Asia neighbours as well as powerful capitalist nations such as the U.S. Therefore, Dengist China was keen to avoid confrontation with the U.S. and Western Europe as well as its southeast Asia neighbours whom it figured would constitute important markets for its goods (Garver 2015).

It is widely argued that the so-called China’s grand strategy was born out of Deng’s approach to international affairs. It is this grand strategy that has progressively informed Sino-ASEAN relations over the past few decades. Wang (2006) argues that China’s grand strategy is to become a dominant power in Asia and ultimate a world power. China’s grand strategy is tied to its national interests. The People’s Republic’s national interests include the defence of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, maintaining domestic political stability, sustaining economic growth and development, advancing and perpetuating the CCP’s rule, and ultimately securing China’s status as a great power (Wong 2007). Under Deng’s leadership, China made numerous attempts to repair its relations with its neighbours in Southeast Asia especially in the 1980s (Wong 2007). Some of the ASEAN countries that China sought to establish diplomatic relations in the late 1980s include Thailand in 1988 (Lijun 2003). Singapore was the last ASEAN state to establish diplomatic relations with China in 1990 (Lijun 2003). By 1991, all the ASEAN members had normalised relations with the People’s Republic.

In dealing with China’s neighbours especially in Southeast Asia, China has sought to employ the so-called soft power in diplomatic circles. Schmidt (2008) observes that soft power arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals and fair economic policies. Since the late 1980s, the Chinese leadership has been to attract and persuade the world community, regional groups as well as individual states to comply with its interests (Schmidt 2008). China’s understanding and use of soft power in dealing with its neighbours was particularly articulated by former Chinese President, Jiang Zemin, who, in 1997, emphasised that China’s foreign policy relied on five major principles of peaceful coexistence (Swe 2014). The first of these five principles was mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. The second one was the principle of mutual non-aggression while the third principle was mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. Equality and mutual benefit constitutes the fourth principle while peaceful co-existence was the last of the five principles (Swe 2014). These principles largely characterise China’s soft power approach in dealing with its even to this date. In fact, the recent aggressive activities by China in the Islands of the South China Sea are informed by the principle of mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty (Swe 2014).

It is often pointed out that China is not an ASEAN member-state and this is sometimes interpreted as showing the unwillingness of China to engage on an equal basis with its neighbours in Southeast Asia (Kausikan 2014). The fact, however, is that China established a strategic partnership with ASEAN. This partnership serves China’s short and long-term interests in Southeast Asia (Kausikan 2014).

Cambodia Background

Cambodia lies in what a region that has traditionally been referred to as Indochina. The modern history of the Kingdom of Cambodia (as the country is officially known) begins in 1953 when the country gained independence from France (BBC Media Action 2012). This is does not, however, mean that Cambodians came into existence only after the French colonised the country. Cambodians are an ancient resilient people who have shown themselves capable of pursuing their destiny even in the face of adversity (Tully 2005). In fact, ancient Cambodia was largely part of the Khmer Kingdom. It is the Khmer ruler who established a Protectorate Treaty with the French in late 1863 (Tully 2005). Through this treaty, Cambodia was effectively protected from frequent Vietnamese and Thai attacks (Tully 2005). After some rebellions and armed conflicts between the various groups in Indochina and the French, the latter agreed to grant independence to Cambodia in 1953. King Sihanouk became Cambodia’s independence leader.

It is essential to point out that Cambodia was already an ideological battleground long before it became independent. In other words, Cambodia lay on the fault lines of the ideological battle between communism and capitalism, and the menace this battle posed to Cambodia preoccupied King Sihanouk in his initial years as Cambodia’s independence leader (Tully 2005). Instead of backing one side to this battle, King Sihanouk chose to maintain a neutral position. He also developed some dictatorial tendencies that angered most Cambodians, especially the opposition. According to Tully (2005), the U.S. was not pleased with King Sihanouk’s policy of neutrality when it came to battle pitting communism and capitalism. It used traditional enemies of Cambodia in order to cajole it into joint the Southeast Asia bandwagon against communism. Interestingly, King Sihanouk did the opposite of what the U.S. expected. That is, he joined the communism. He did this by, first of all, recognising the People’s Republic of China in 1958, much to the chagrin of the U.S. and the anti-communist countries in Southeast Asia such as Thailand, South Vietnam and Malaysia (Tully 2005). The late 1950s and early 1960s witnessed the rise of Cambodia’s Communists, which were led by Saloth Sar who would later be popularly identified as Pol Pot. King Sihanouk was suspicious of the true intentions and loyalty of the Khmer Rouges (red Khmers) (as the Communist came to be known). Therefore, he started to crack them down.

Interestingly, King Sihanouk cracked down on Cambodian communists while at the same time implementing leftist economic policies such as the nationalisation of enterprises. This move plunged Cambodia into economic turmoil and in turn weakened the King’s grasp on power. He was deposed by his own parliament while on an overseas holiday in March 1970 (Tully 2005). The new government was pro-capitalist, something that enraged Beijing and the USSR. Sihanouk was offered refuge in China where he plotted to return to power.

The Chinese-backed Khmer Rouges eventually deposed the U.S.-supported government in Cambodia from power in 1975. The new regime, which was led by Pol Pot, would prove to be the worst experiment in governance that Cambodia has ever had. In the four years (1975-79) that the Khmer Rouges had assumed power in Cambodia, close to two million Cambodians lost their lives, with a quarter of these having been murdered by the Khmer Rouges security apparatus while the rest died as a result of starvation (Jeldres 2010). In 1979, Vietnam invaded Cambodia and deposed the Khmer Rouges from power thus effectively bringing to an end the horrors occasioned on the people by this regime. Cambodia went back and forth in its attempts to create a stable political environment (Thayer 2009). The Vietnamese officially pulled out of Cambodia in 1989 and the country fell under a U.N. transitional authority (Sambath n.d). Proper elections were held in 1993 and elections have since been held with current long serving and current prime minister Hun Sen largely winning most of them.

Current Sino-Cambodia Relations

Cambodia and Chinese relations did not begin the former’s recognitions of the latter in 1958. According to Ciorciari (2013), Sino-Cambodia relations have been in existence for the past eight centuries. They date back to 1296 when a Chinese diplomat visited Angkor city (Ciorciari 2013). Cambodia is, therefore, one of the closest and oldest allies of China in southeast Asia, and probably the world. It should, however, be pointed out that the nature of China’s policy towards Cambodia has been changing from time to time.

Sino-Cambodia relations resumed in earnest in 1958 when King Sihanouk of Cambodia formally recognised the People’s Republic of China, which was then led by Mao Zedong (Jililian 2013). In fact, King Sihanouk further made it mission to personally cultivate friendly relations with Chinese leaders (Ciorciari 2013). King Sihanouk was particularly helping in breaking China’s isolation during the 1960s when he lobbied for the expulsion of the Republic of China (Taiwan) from the U.N. and the admittance of the People’s Republic to the global body (Sambath n.d). These efforts by Sihanouk particularly proved helpful in laying a solid foundation for long-term cooperation on various areas between the People’s Republic and Cambodia. It has to, however, be pointed out that China’s policy towards has been changing with time. Sambath (n.d) further notes that China’s policies toward Cambodia have not always being welcomed with open arms by the various regimes in Phnom Penh. In other words, there have been bumps in these relations but the two countries have managed to move beyond these bumps.

An often cited example of an occasion when Sino-Cambodia relations almost broke down was China’s financial and logistical support of the Khmer Rouge. According to Sambath (n.d), China, in recognition of its role in advancing communist rule world-wide, rendered its support to the Cambodian communists (the Khmer Rouge) without King Sihanouk’ knowledge. Relations between King Sihanouk and China almost broke down when the King learned of the relationship between Khmer Rouge and the People’s Republic in 1967 (Ciorciari 2013). Rather than end or suspend relations with China, King Sihanouk began to crackdown on the Cambodian communists due to the fear that they were loyal to the Chinese rather than their nation and government. It was China, which provided refuge and support to King Sihanouk when he was deposed in the 1970 coup (Jeldres 2010). Under Chinese tutelage, Sihanouk formed a united front with the Khmer Rouge in order to oust the coup plotters who had ousted him.

It has already been mentioned that the Khmer Rouge rose to power in Cambodia in 1975 and it was at this time that Sihanouk returned from his exile in China (Jililian 2013). It is essential to point out that China was the first country to open a fully functioning embassy in Cambodia’s capital when the Khmer Rouge came to power in 1975 (Sambath n.d). It was also China which provided the Khmer Rouge with diplomatic backing abroad. Moreover, China vehemently opposed the Vietnam invasion into Cambodia, which deposed the Khmer Rouge regime in 1979 (Ciorciari 2013). In fact, China once again backed Sihanouk (who had once again fled to China) mounting an anti-Vietnamese armed campaign until it pulled out of Cambodia in 1989.

Sihanouk is frequently considered by anti-Chinese elements in Cambodia as a China’s puppet. Critics of Sihanouk often cite his regular exiles to China as justification for this description (Jeldres 2010). Those sympathetic to Sihanouk’s approach to Cambodia’s relations with China equally point out that other political players in the country were once puppets of other outside forces. For example, Cambodia’s long-serving prime minister and Sihanouk’s political rival, Hun Sen, was once considered a Vietnamese a ‘puppet’. In fact, Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) was once considered pro-Vietnamese (Sambath n.d). This explains China’s reluctance to deal with the CPP and Hun Sen in the 1980’s and the support the People’s Republic extended to Sihanouk and other elements in order to depose the CPP and force Vietnam out of Cambodia. It should be pointed out that China and Hun Sen have since repaired their relations especially towards the end of the 1990s decade.

First, the Cambodian government, led by Sihanouk, banned the Khmer Rouge in 1994 (Thayer 2009). This angered China, which still supported the Khmer Rouge. China saw this move by the royalists to outlaw the Khmer Rouge as unnecessary and having the potential to lead to renewed internal conflict. The second issue and one that was more pressing has to do with Cambodia’s relations with Taiwan, which China considers its breakaway province. More specifically, Sihanouk’s party, FUNCIPEC, had begun to normalise relations with Taiwan during the 1990s much to the chagrin of China (Thayer 2009). The FUNCIPEC government did, in fact, sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on economic relations with Taiwan in 1994. By 1996, the relations between the FUNCIPEC and China had irreparably deteriorated and began seeking another partner who would further its interests in Cambodia (Jeldres 2010). This partner came in the form of the CPP and its leader, Hun Sen; China’s former nemesis.

It shall be recalled that in 1997, there were violent clashes between armed groups affiliated to FUNCIPEC and CPP (Sambath n.d). These clashes ended with the CPP and Prime Minister Hun Sen seizing full control of Cambodia. The CPP particularly accused Taiwan of supplying arms to FUNCIPEC elements and effectively expelled Taiwanese diplomats from Cambodia (Sambath n.d). China was the first country to fully support the changes in government in Cambodia. Contrastingly, Hun Sen and the CPP received international condemnation and sanctions were imposed against Cambodia following these changes in government (Thayer 2009). It was during this period that a new dawn in Sino-Cambodian relations was ushered in. China was opposed to the international sanctions imposed on Cambodia (Thayer 2009). In fact, subsequent years saw China assist Prime Minister Hun Sen consolidate his hold onto power. Additionally, China became Cambodia’s primary benefactor with the People’s Republic providing more aid to Cambodia than any other donor (Thayer 2009). Economic and political relations between China and Cambodia further improved in the 2000s with China investing more in Cambodia compared to other foreign states. These special relations between China and Cambodia persist to date.

Conclusion

It should essentially be pointed out that the enhancement of relations between China and Cambodia is part of China’s grand strategy. There have been questions asked as to how Cambodia fits into this grand strategy. In fact, scholars have been keen to understand how Sino-Cambodian relations fit in the broad China’s grand strategy jigsaw puzzle. China relies on countries such as Cambodia to build its own alliances in Southeast Asia and the Pacific in general. It is such alliances, which help in promoting and defending Chinese interests within the framework of regional bodies such as ASEAN and the Association of Asia-Pacific Cooperation (APEC) of which the U.S. is a member. In fact, Cambodia has been steadfast in its defence of China in these regional bodies. For example, Cambodia has on several occasions failed to endorse regional communiqués condemning China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea. This, therefore, ensures that China is not perceived as an aggressive power and any anti-China alliance in the region is effectively countered.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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